This was written in 2023.
“The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don’t, it will become deeper and angrier.”
——Tony Blair (“Africa: A Scar”)
Recently, Sudan military junta started a civil war between the country’s 2 armed forces. Unfortunately, such political instability is not unique in Sudan, but many on the continent. Since the decolonisation wave in the 1950s and 1960s, many newborn sub-Sahara-African countries did not enter a happy new era, but political chaos or dictatorship. From January 1956 to December 2001, there were 80 successful coups, 108 failed coup attempts, and 139 reported plots and civil wars among 48 independent sub-Saharan African (SSA) states (McGowan 339). This paper is trying to propose a way to solve the instability of these weak states who do not have strong institutions to maintain stability. The international security guarantee and assistance can help build political stability in weak African countries by deterring and cracking down internal subversive forces and helping build strong institutions. UNSDG16 is aims to reach “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”(United Nations), and political stability is the base of these goals.
International security guarantees can deter internal subversive forces, crackdown coups and armed rebellions efficiently when they occur, therefore promoting political stability in weak states. International guarantee means foreign powers who can deploy globally promise to intervene when there is a coup or armed rebel that the weak state itself cannot handle. Many postcolonial African countries, which are the “weak states” have low levels of state building(Fukuyama), have an army that is organised enough to overthrow the civil government, but not solid and intellectual enough to rule the country. The essence of the problem is that these states themselves cannot maintain order, whether under democracy or junta. The international community provides a safety assurance to the government of these weak states that yet do not have strong institutions to prevent such overthrow forces. How can it discourage coups? Paul Collier has logically proved why international factors deter potential plots. International guarantees can deter coups in two ways: first, the army will be worried about the consequences of launching a coup, namely the rapid intervention of a much stronger foreign force to put out the plot; second, if the country’s government is no longer internationally guaranteed due to corruption or other issues, there is a high probability that the army will stage a coup. In turn, this would be a check on the guaranteed government. Furthermore, no country under the clear guarantee of global powers has ever experienced a coup. (Having military bases does not equal to clear guarantee) In contrast, there are successful cases of effective intervention and guarantee. For example, the UK provides Sierra Leon security guarantee after restored basic order in this post-civil war country. Since then, the RUF, which did not obey the peace treaty and collaborated with the coup group AFRC, has turned into a civil political party, and the country has had certain peace and democratic power transformations(Evoe). This is a case where international intervention successfully ended the civil war, guaranteed and assisted in the post-war period, and restored and maintained political stability as a result. Security provided by a third party capable of enforcing peace and protecting disarmed factions can help both sides trust that their security will be protected throughout the disarmament process(Walter 166). In addition to that recent success, France had completed many successful interventions in the last century under their bilateral defence agreement (accord de defense) with newborn African states. Between 1960 and 1964, French military forces intervened in Cameroun, Congo Brazzaville twice, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Gabon, as these countries signed the agreement and experienced coups or tribal wars. This kind of guarantees and actions decreased as France shifted foreign policy, focusing more on European affairs(Lellouche). These cases prove that rapid intervention is feasible, thus, it can effectively deter internal subversive forces. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate that the guarantee does lead to peace, implying that the international community’s guarantee promotes political stability in weak states.
The guarantee and intervention under the agreement are not violate sovereignty. Nationalists may disagree with the idea of foreign intervention, they may claim that it violates their motherland’s sovereignty. However, the sovereignty only can be violated if it really exists. According to Britannica, sovereignty is “the ultimate overseer, or authority, in the decision-making process of the state and in the maintenance of order”. And these weak states, which cannot maintain political stability, fix internal issues and implement policies, do not have the “ultimate overseer” to their own. Hence, international assistance does not violate their sovereignty, because there is no actual sovereignty. Furthermore, international intervention occurs only when the most despised and unwanted situations occur, as specified in the agreement. A guarantee is a promise, a promise to help when needed. It is a bilateral agreement. No foreign power should force others to sign. The guarantee is not an excuse for military presence in other countries.
The international community should assist weak sub-Saharan African countries in organising their institutions. State-building is a long process. With the reality that these weak states are “too large to be nations, and yet too small to be states” (Collier), we should not wait for these artificially made countries to evolve into modern states by themselves. Both the people of the countries and the international community cannot afford the bloody process of a weak state developing into a modern state. Or they may grow into extremes or other forms of weak states we never had before, as in Afghanistan, where the construction of national identity by the USSR’s invasion eventually developed into religious fanaticism. One of the most critical factors of a state is the monopoly of violence. The monopoly of violence in modern states is usually achieved through organised institutions(e.g. government departments and law systems), non-corrupt administration, and organised and disciplined police. Take the police institution as an example. The police in weak states is either unable to cover the entire country, are corrupt, or too inadequate to fight the local gangs. Hence, the state cannot maintain the order and enact laws. For instance, the Sierra Leone Police(SLP) was in such unreliable status before the United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform(SSR). The UK, Commonwealth, and UN CIVPOL(United Nations’ Civilian Police) advisers trained SLP officers in basic skills they had never learned(Horn). SLP is now “no longer politicised and incapacitated” and has restored “Basic capacity and public trust”(Horn 121). It is a successful international assistance case. The case shows 2 points: first, the idea of international powers help built institutions is feasible; second, the “assistance” does not mean foreign control, advisers and trainers are the solution. International assistance should be limited to advisers and trainers. Only the assistance in this way can let countries be helped build their own institutions without a typically long and bloody process. It is better to teach a man fishing than to give him a fish.
In conclusion, the international community can promote political stability in weak sub-Saharan African countries by making security guarantee agreements and training assistance. The guarantee can deter coups effectively. The assistance can help build institutions. However, governments of the countries that actually need help may not want foreign assistance because it would affect the interests of the ruling group. Additionally, powerful foreign powers may abuse their intervention for their own benefit, which could undermine the legitimacy of such guarantees. Nevertheless, the international role in accelerating sub-Saharan African countries’ state-building should not be underestimated. The Global community should work together to create a better world.
Note: I was inspired by Mr Collier’s book Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, so I did some research and inductions.
Bibliography
Collier, Paul. Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. Vintage Books, 2010. Accessed 27 April 2023.
Evoe, Patrick J. “Operation Palliser: The British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone, A Case of a Successful Use of Western Military Interdiction in a Sub-Sahara African Civil War.” Electronic Theses and Dissertations, Texas State University-San Marcos, 2008. Texas State University, https://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/2602. Accessed 30 May 2023.
Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press, 2004. Accessed 27 April 2023.
Horn, Adrian, et al. “United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone.” Civil Wars, vol. 8, no. 2, Taylor and Francis, Dec. 2006, pp. 109–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240600877247. Accessed 30 May 2023.
Iron, Richard. “Rapid Intervention and Conflict Resolution: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone 2000-2002.” Australian Army Occasional Paper Conflict Theory and Strategy, Feb. 2019. 003. Accessed 30 May 2023.
Lellouche, Pierre, and Dominique Moisi. “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization.” International Security, vol. 3, no. 4, 1979, pp. 108–33. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2626765. Accessed 2 June 2023.
McGowan, Patrick J. “African Military Coups d’état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, pp. 339–70. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876235. Accessed 15 May 2023. Accessed 27 April 2023.
“Sovereignty.” Edited by Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, 3 Apr. 2023, www.britannica.com/topic/sovereignty. Accessed 30 May 2023.
The Independent, “Africa: A Scar on the Conscience of the World.” The Independent, 20 Aug. 2004, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/africa-a-scar-on-the-conscience-of-the-world-52775.html. Accessed 30 May 2023.
United Nations. “THE 17 GOALS.” United Nations, sdgs.un.org/goals. Accessed 29 May 2023.
Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton University Press, 2002. Accessed 30 May 2023.